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I.
INTRODUCTION
The last several years have been marked by considerable economic
reform in nonmarket countries. The changes which have occurred have
undoubtedly impacted upon United States' law and policy with respect to
the United States' treatment of those countries. The purpose of this paper
is to examine the effects, or potential effects, this reform has had, or could
have, on the United States' law of countervailing duties with respect to
nonmarket economies. In particular, this paper seeks to demonstrate,
through case analyses, how these effects are, or likely will be, driven by
those basic principles already established under the United States'
countervailing duty law. Part I is a general look at the United States' trade
law, highlighting some recent changes made to it by the Uruguay Round
Agreement. Part II outlines how the United States Commerce Department
(Commerce), which is responsible for administering this law, developed
the United States' policy on countervailing duty law and nonmarket
economies. Part III is devoted to a discussion of important antidumping
law developments which impact upon the application of countervailing
duties to nonmarket economies in transition. Part IV examines what can
already be said about the application of countervailing duty law to
reforming nonmarkets given the fact this is still a very new area for
Commerce. This paper will then conclude with some final thoughts on
related foreign policy concerns.
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GENERAL UNITED STATES' LAW OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

The purpose of United States' countervailing duty law is "to offset
the unfair advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from
export subsidies paid by their governments."' Before the Commerce
Department can impose countervailing duties on any imports, it must make
a two-part determination. First, the goods are being subsidized by the
foreign government; and second, a United States' industry is materially
injured, or is threatened with material injury, or the establishment of a
United States' industry is slowed because of the subsidized imports. 2 Upon
making a positive finding for countervailing duties, the Commerce
Department will publish a countervailing duty order covering the
subsidized goods, or "subject merchandise"' in the Federal Register
pursuant to this order. The Commerce Department will then direct
Customs to impose countervailing duties equal to the amount of the net
subsidy.'

The Commerce Department defines subsidies as direct and indirect
government grants, whether in the form of direct cash payments, tax
credits, or artificially low-interest loans, for the production or exportation
of goods., In its statutory definition of subsidy, the Tariff Act of 1930 lists
two types: export and domestic.6 The former kind are defined to include
those examples which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) Subsidies Code enumerates in its Illustrative List of Export
Subsidies. That list includes various subsidies, credits, and preferential tax
7
treatments contingent upon export.
In defining domestic subsidies, the Tariff Act holds that subsidies
must be provided "to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of
Thus, United States' trade law aims at
enterprises or industries.",
countervailing, not foreign government programs designed to achieve
1. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 455-56 (1978)).
2. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1) (1995) [hereinafter Tariff Act].
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(d).
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c). An estimated amount is used before Commerce makes a more
definite assessment.
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1).
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Agreement on Interpretation and Application
of articles, VI, XVI and XXIII of the agreement of Oct. 30, 1947 as rectified by the procesverbal of Dec. 17, 1979. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, TIAS No. 9619
[hereinafter GATT]. This is part of the Tokyo Round.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(I), (ii).
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broad economic goals such as lower inflation or unemployment, but the
government aid which benefits a specific economic sector. The Tariff Act
states such aid includes provisions of capital, low-interest loans, debt
forgiveness, and cost assumptions.9
III.

SIGNIFICANT URUGUAY ROUND CHANGES TO UNITED STATES
COUNTERVAILING DUTY OBLIGATIONS
Until recently, United States' trade law did not require Commerce
to conduct a material injury test for subsidized goods from all countries.
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the United States was obligated
to conduct such a test on imports only from those nations which: (1) were
signatories to the Tokyo Round Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Code; (2) had assumed comparable obligations; (3) or were not signatories
to GATT but had bilateral trade agreements with the United States
requiring unconditional Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment.' 0
Otherwise, countervailing duties could be imposed without an injury test.
This bifurcated system changed, however, with the Uruguay Round. All
signatories to that accord are afforded an injury test, and since all World
Trade Organization (WTO) members are parties to these agreements, an
injury test must now be applied by the United States in every
countervailing duty case involving a WTO member."
Prior to the Uruguay Round, controversy frequently arose
regarding exactly what type of government-conferred benefits constitute
"subsidies" under GATT."1 At times it was unclear just when the United
States could hold such benefits as actionable, under the GATT law of
countervailing duties. The Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement clarified
this area of GATT obligations when it defined a subsidy as a "financial
contribution" provided directly or indirectly by a government which
confers a benefit."
The Agreement more completely developed this
definition of an actionable subsidy by establishing a classification of
subsidies. The classes include subsidies which are: (1) prohibited, or "red

9. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(I), (ii).
10. Walter Kolligs, The United States Law of Countervailing Duties and FederalAgency
Procurement After the Tokyo Round: Is it 'GATT Legal'? 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 553, 568
(1990); see also JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 785 (1995).

11.

19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b)(1)(a).

12.

JACKSON, supra note 10, at 783. 785.

13. GA'T

,

supra note 7, art.1, §1.1.
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light;" (2) permissible, but actionable if they cause adverse trade effects or
"amber light;" and (3) nonactionable, or "green light. "
Under this new Uruguay Round classification, the United States
may continue to treat export subsidies as a violation of GATT obligations,
but may also treat as prohibited any de facto export subsidies or subsidies
contingent upon the manufacturer's use of domestic materials for
production." The United States may now also legally take countervailing
action when it can demonstrate, by means proscribed under the "amber
light" category, the use of subsidies by a nation has adversely affected
United States' trade interests through price or market share effects;
whether they have caused "serious prejudice" to United States' interests.16
In cases where serious prejudice is presumed, the burden is on the
subsidizing nation to demonstrate harm was not caused to the importing
nation. The new classification prohibits the United States from taking
countervailing action in certain cases of governmental assistance for:
industrial research, regional development, or the adaptation of existing
plants or equipment to meet new environmental standards. 7 A notification
provision allows for other countries to judge the permissibility of subsidies
before they are granted by a government.

IV. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES' POLICY ON
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES LAW AND NONMARKET ECONOMIES
AWARDED
A. Imports of Carbon Steel Wire from Polandand Czechoslovakia
The first three petitions for application of countervailing duties
against nonmarket economies were filed in 1983.1' In September of that
year, the American Textile Manufacturers Institute filed a petition alleging
subsidization of textile and apparel imports from the People's Republic of
China.'9 That petition was ultimately withdrawn on the day the Commerce
14. See also U.S. COMMERCE DEP'T, UNITED STATES-CHINA LEGAL SEMINAR-UNITED
STATES ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING LAWS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 23 (1994) [hereinafter SEMINAR].

15. GATT, supra note 7, art. 3, § 3.1(a). The United States must, however, allow a threeyear grace period from the Agreement's entry into force before it may act on the latter two
practices. SEMINAR, supra note 14, at 24.
16.

GAT, supra note 7, art. 6; see also SEMINAR, supra note 14, at 24.

17. GATT, supra note 7, art. 6.
18. Michael G. Egge, The Threat of United States CountervailingDuty Liability in the New
Emerging Market Economies in Eastern Europe: A Snake in the Garden, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 941,
953 (1990).
19. Id.
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Department was scheduled to issue its preliminary determination. Later
that year in November, a group of United States' producers of carbon steel
wire rod filed a petition against imports of that product from Poland, and
another petition against imports from Czechoslovakia. ° In March of 1984,
United States' producers of potassium chloride (potash) filed petitions
against imports of potash from the Soviet Union and East Germany.21
In May 1984, the Commerce Department finally declared its
stance on the applicability of countervailing duties to nonmarket economy
countries. In its final determination on the cases of the carbon steel wire
rod imports from Czechoslovakia and Poland, Commerce decided
countervailing duty law could not be applied to nonmarket economies.22
The Department's rational in each case was that it was impossible to
identify a countervailing subsidy in a nonmarket economy. Under the
United States' law of countervailing duties, the Department recognized a
subsidy as "any action that distorts or subverts the market process and
results in a misallocation of resources." 23 Yet, in nonmarket economies,
there is no such market process to distort. Nonmarket economies rely on
the central government rather than market forces to determine prices and
resource allocation. As a result, anything which results in such markets is
caused by the central planning, and not by subsidization.4
Thus,
Commerce found it lacked the grounds to find a nonmarket government
action to be a countervailing subsidy.,As a result of its conclusions, the Commerce Department denied
26
the petitions for duties against the Polish and Czechoslovakian imports.
One month later, the Commerce Department dismissed the petitions
against the Soviet Union and East German imports and rescinded the
initiations of the related countervailing duty investigations. 7 The above
determinations were appealed by the petitioners, and the Commerce
Department's ruling was reversed by the United States Court of

20. Id.
21. Id. at 954.
22. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370, 19,374 (1984).
23. Id. at 19,371.
24. Id.
25. id.
26. Id.at 19,370.
27. Potassium Chloride From the German Democratic Republic, Recision of Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of the Petition, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (1984);
Potassium Chloride from the Soviet Union, Recision of Initiation of Countervailing Duty
Investigation and Dismissal of the Petition, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (1984).
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International Trade in Continental Steel Corp. v. United States.' The
court held that the language of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 did
not make any distinctions concerning a country's economy, and that it did
not matter whether a subsidy could be said to exist in a nonnarket
economy under our legal definitions.29 Finally, the case was brought
before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Georgetown Steel v.
United States." The court reversed the Court of International Trade and
sustained the Commerce Department's position against the nonapplicability
of countervailing duties against imports from nonmarket economies."
B. Georgetown Steel
The basis of the Georgetown Steel decision was the court's
determination that the concepts of subsidization and its resultant
misallocation of resources, indeed had no meaning outside the context of
market-based economic systems since commercial activity in nonmarket
economies is controlled according to central plans.3 2

The court was

convinced by the Commerce Department's argument that subsidies cannot
affect the allocations of resources when the state establishes such
allocations pursuant to a central economic plan.33 The court found that, in
such markets, government subsidies may aid producers in accomplishing
their set economic goals, but the subsidies "do not create the kind of unfair
competitive advantage over American firms against which the
countervailing duty act was directed."1' Since such nonmarket economy
subsidies do not help producers make sales in the United States which they
otherwise may not have made, the court held countervailing duties to be
inapplicable under United States' trade law."
It is interesting to note that in its reasoning, the Georgetown Steel
court went back to the basic purpose of United States' countervailing duty
law. The court went beyond the narrow analysis of the International Trade
Court and sought out whether or not the benefit conferred by a nonmarket
government actually gave its producers an unfair competitive advantage in
foreign markets such as the United States. By showing that the nature of
28. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
29. Id. at 551; see also 19 U.S.C.S. May 1995 JM Supp. § 1303 repealed.
30. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d at 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1315.
33. Id. at 1316.
34. Id. at 1315.
35. Georgetown Steel Corp., 801 F.2d at 1315.
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nonmarket economies precludes such an effect, the court made it clear why
countervailing duty law cannot be applied to nonmarket economies to
6
accomplish the law's purpose.1
The Georgetown Steel court strengthened its position by pointing
out that in a nonmarket economy the government owns everything. Thus,
if the government were to give a true subsidy, it would effectively be
giving itself a subsidy, which is impossible. 37 The court also added its
belief that Congress did not intend the countervailing duty laws to apply to
nonmarket economies . The court stated, if Congress had intended the
countervailing duty laws to apply to nonmarket economies, it would not
have remained silent with regard to countervailing duties when it amended
the antidumping laws in 1974 and 1979 to cover goods from nonmarket
economies. 39 Such silence led the court to believe Congress meant for the
antidumping laws to be the sole defense for United States' manufacturers
against unfairly traded goods from nonmarket economies.40 Finally, the
court declared that the Commerce Department was neither unreasonable
nor abusive of its discretion in its determination that countervailing duty
law was inapplicable to nonmarket economies.'
C. Commerce's Current Challenge: Nonmarket Economies in
Transition
In recent years, a number of the traditional nonmarket economies
have undergone considerable political and economic reforms. Included in
these reforms has been a shift from centrally planned to market oriented
economies. During this period of transition, these countries have had
neither pure centrally controlled economies, nor true market economies.
As these countries continue their transitions, the Commerce Department's
challenge has become the determination of whether, or to what degree,
countervailing duty law should apply to them. 2 The Department's task is
to fairly and accurately determine whether certain government-subsidized
imports from these countries are produced in an industry which operates
under a free market system. A positive finding, in this regard, means that
36.

David W. Richardson & Robert E. Nielsen, Recent Developments in the Treatment of

Nonmarket Economies Under the AD/CVD Laws, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS

1995, at 162 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-789).
37. Georgetown Steel Corp., 801 F.2d at 1316.
38. Id. at 1315.
39. Id. at 1317-18.

40. Id. at 1318.
41.

Id.

42. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 151.
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our countervailing duty law ought to apply to these imports. While
making these evaluations, the Commerce Department must also seek to
balance competing United States' foreign and domestic policy goals,
namely the encouragement of further transitions to market economies and
4
the protection of United States' industries from subsidized imports. 1
As already discussed, countervailing duty law has not been
considered applicable to nonmarket economies since the Georgetown Steel
court concluded subsidies have no meaning outside the context of marketbased economic systems."
However, when a reforming nonmarket
economy begins to exhibit elements of both market and nonmarket
economies, it becomes more difficult to justify the inapplicability of this
law.
During this time of transition, prices and costs which were
previously set by the state begin to be set by the emerging market forces of
supply and demand.4 1
Thus, it becomes inappropriate to hold
countervailing duty law inapplicable under the assumption that subsidies to
these transitional economy industries fail to either distort resource
allocation, or to give these industries a competitive advantage in the United
States' marketplace. If a manufacturer in a certain foreign industry has
suddenly been freed from central planning and is now basing its production
decisions on market forces, government subsidies would influence this
manufacturer to produce more or less different products. 4 Likewise, these
subsidies would help the manufacturer make sales it would otherwise not
have been able to realize. This is exactly the kind of unfair competitive
advantage which our countervailing duty law was meant to prevent.
Therefore, the Commerce Department would need to find some way to
legally apply the countervailing duty law in these circumstances.4
Perhaps due to efforts by some foreign countries to honor their
international obligations to restrict subsidies, or perhaps due to the
inability of some countries to afford subsidization, the Commerce
Department has yet been faced with a petition for countervailing action
against imports from reforming nonmarket economies." However, if a
foreign government from a transitional economy nation in question began
to recover from their current economic difficulties, and can afford subsidy
programs once again, it is certainly possible such petitions may eventually
43. Id. at 152.
44. Georgetown Steel Corp., 801 F.2d at 1308.
45. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 164.
46. Id. at 165.
47. Id.
48. Telephone Interview with Paulo Mendes, Policy Analyst, United States Department of
Commerce (Apr. 7, 1995) [herinafter Interview].
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be brought to the Commerce Department. The Commerce Department
may have to turn to existent United States' antidumping law for help in
determining how to treat such imports. Currently, there exists no
legislation or case law which specifically addresses the application of
49
countervailing duties to reforming nonmarket economies.
Nevertheless, Congress and the courts have provided helpful
direction in this area in the related realm of antidumping law. Congress'
decision to amend the nonmarket economy provisions of the antidumping
law would provide the legal basis for the Commerce Department to apply
our countervailing duty law in the case of a reforming nonmarket
economy.5 Thus, it is necessary to examine relevant antidumping law
which the Commerce Department would consider.
V.

ANTIDUMPING LAW AND REFORMING NONMARKET ECONOMIES

A. The Problem with Valuation
Antidumping law is aimed at offsetting the margin amount in price
by which an imported good is being unfairly dumped on the United States'
market)' Thus, the Commerce Department obviously must determine this
dumping margin as accurately as possible if it is to truly carry out the
purpose of this law.-2 In normal antidumping investigations, the
Commerce Department compares an import's foreign market value to the
United States' value to determine the margin amount by which the
imported good is being dumped into the United States' market.-3 If the
import comes from a market economy country, the Commerce Department
may base the foreign market value on prices in the exporting country, in
another foreign country, or on a constructed valueM
Valuation is not as simple when an import arrives from a
nonmarket economy nation. In these cases, the Commerce Department
cannot use the nonmarket economy prices since, from a United States'
perspective, the prices are distorted by central planning and have nothing
to do with market forces. 5 Since the economic principles upon which
nonmarket economy prices are based are incompatible with the supply and
49.
50.
51.
52.
1990)).
53.

Id.
Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 165.
Id. at 155.
Id. (quoting Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1190 (Fed. Cir.

19 U.S.C. § 1673(1).
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1677-b(a).
55. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 155-56; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A).
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demand principles upon which United States' prices are established, use of
the nonmarket economy prices in determining the dumping margin would
not produce a meaningful result."
Section 1316 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
19881, provided the Commerce Department with a method for more
accurately calculating the foreign market value of nonmarket economy
imports. 8 The statute directs the Commerce Department to determine
foreign market values by totaling the amounts of the input factors used in
the production of goods . 9 The factors are computed by using their values
in a "surrogate" market economy country where is economically
comparable.60 Thus, the distortion of nonmarket economy prices is
eliminated and the Commerce Department can make a meaningful
calculation of the dumping margin.
Over the next several years following the Act of 1988, a number
of nonmarket economy countries continued to make transitions to market
economies. Prices in some industries within these countries began to be
driven by market forces rather than by central planning. In these cases,
the Commerce Department would better meet its goal of accurate dumping
margin measurements by foregoing its use of surrogate market economy
values, and simply using the nonmarket economy countries' prices for the
goods in question. 6' In the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Congress made the provision for the Commerce Department to use
nonmarket economy prices in those cases where the prices of the imports
in question are found to be sufficiently market driven.6 2 The Department's
problem was Congress gave no statutory guidance in determining when the
exporting country's prices were market oriented and sufficiently free from
the value distortions caused by central planning.6 3 Consequently, the
Commerce Department had to develop an approach for determining value
distortions which would be consistent with the purpose of antidumping law
and its nonmarket economy provisions.6'

56. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 155-56.
57. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1316, 102
Stat. 1186-88 (1988) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1677-b(c) (1988)).

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

19 U.S.C. § 1677-b(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1995).
19 U.S.C. § 1677-b(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1995).
19 U.S.C. § 1677-b(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1995).
Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 157.
19 U.S.C. § 16776(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1995).
Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 154-55.
Id. at 155.
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B. The Bubbles Test: Imports of Lug Nuts and Fans From the
People's Republic of China (PRC)
The Department's first test for determining whether or not certain
nonmarket economy prices were distorted was the "bubbles of capitalism"
test.6 This test was developed by the Commerce Department in 1991 from
an investigation of certain imports of fans from the People's Republic of
China (PRC)." This test was also used by the Commerce Department in
another 1991 case involving lug nuts from the PRC.1 The PRC remains
the only country against which the bubbles test has ever been used.6
Under the "bubbles test," or the "100% test," if the Commerce
Department finds that 100% of the nonmarket economy prices of
manufacturers' costs were "market driven," then it will consider those
foreign producers as operating within a "bubble of capitalism."69 In such
cases, the Department uses the reported nonmarket economy input prices
rather than surrogate market values in determining the foreign market
values of the imports in question. 70
The following case analysis is used to illustrate how and why the
Commerce Department applied the "bubbles test" to imports from China.
In Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People's Republic of China;
Preliminary Determinations of Sales Less than Fair Value, the Commerce
Department first had to get information from each individual company on
its sources of cost inputs, manufacturing processes, distribution channels,
controls on external trade, profit retention, and the nature of its
ownership.71 The Commerce Department then stated that it would decide
whether each company was a "bubble of capitalism" on the basis of
whether a company could demonstrate, de jure and de facto, that it was
free from central economic controls.,2 A finding for de jure absence of
central control could be supported by, but does not require, evidence of:
"(1) an absence of restrictive stipulations associated with an individual
exporter's business and export licenses; and (2) any legislative enactments

65. Id. at 157.
66. Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Oscillating Fans and
Ceiling Fans from the People's Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 25,664 (1991).
67. Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts From
the People's Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 46,153 (1991).
68. Interview, supra note 48.
69. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 158.
70. Id.
71. 56 Fed. Reg. 25.664.
72. 56 Fed. Reg. 25,664.
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[sic] devolving central control of export trading companies.' 3 De facto
absence of central control could be supported by evidence that: "(1) each
exporter sets its own export prices independently of the government and
other exporters; and (2) .
each exporter can keep the proceeds from its

sales. "74
The PRC manufacturers submitted evidence in order to support
their market oriented status so their own prices or costs could be used in
the Commerce Department's dumping calculations. First, PRC industries
involved in the case were privately owned and operated on market
principles." Second, the overwhelming majority of their input materials
were purchased from outside the PRC, or from other foreign investment
projects in the southern part of China.7 6 Third, all of their output was sold
outside the PRC. Finally, evidence was submitted to prove that the labor
market in the southern part of the PRCs was subject to competitive
forces."
The PRC manufacturers then attempted to convince the Commerce
Department that their industry was market oriented as a whole by arguing
that: their producers are generally foreign-owned; their government does
not control prices, production, profits distribution, or the use of capital;
materials used by their manufacturers generally come from outside the
PRC; those materials which are purchased from within the PRC are
generally done so at arm's length; the government does not control prices
for materials or involve itself with labor; companies in the industry deal
freely with their employees; PRC companies pay a higher rate for
electricity than those in Hong Kong; and the government does not impose
foreign exchange controls on the companies.7" Therefore, the PRC
manufacturers argued their own prices could be used because their
industry was sufficiently free of state control under section 771(18) of the
amended United States Tariff Act of 1930."
The Commerce Department's written reaction to the above
evidence seems to convey the frustration which must have influenced

73. 56 Fed.
74. 56 Fed.
75. 56 Fed.
76. 56 Fed.

Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.

25,664.
25,664.
25,664.
at 25,666.

77. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,666.
78. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,666-67.
79. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,667. That section lists the factors Commerce must take into
account in evaluating whether an economy is a nonmarket one: currency convertibility, freely
bargained wage rates, government ownership or control over production factors.
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Commerce to decide on such a stringent, "all-or-nothing," rule such as the
"bubbles test." Commerce stated
These assertions, and our understanding of the
circumstances under which these respondents produce and
sell the subject merchandise, require us to consider how
any industrial sector or any commercial entity in an NME
can be said to be operating on market principles such that
costs and prices are acceptable, reliable measures of fair
market value.10
Commerce then indicated, since the legislative history of the Tariff Act
provided no helpful guidance in determining the fair market value for
producers from nonmarket economies in transition, Commerce would
require a showing by the manufacturers that all of their costs and prices
are market oriented.,' Absent such a showing, the manufacturers could not
use their own prices in the dumping calculations of fair market value, and
instead factors of production methodology would be used.Y In the case of
the fan manufacturers, the Commerce Department's preliminary
determination was not all of their manufacturing costs were market based,
therefore, they could not be used in the calculations.83
C. The Mini-Bubbles Test: Initiation of Countervailing Duties
Investigation of the Lug Nut Imports
Eventually, the Department must have realized an "all-or-nothing"
test was not appropriate for evaluating the market orientations of reforming
nonmarket economy producers. The reality is manufacturers in reforming
nonmarket economies use some production materials which have market
driven prices, and other materials which have centrally controlled prices.
To allow the "100% test" to accommodate for this fact, the Department
added a second "mini-bubbles" test.8 ' Under this test, it is not necessary
for 100% of the manufacturer's costs to be market driven. If the
manufacturers can demonstrate that at least some of their costs are market
driven, then those nonmarket economy values will be used in the
Department calculations; the surrogate market values are then used only
for the remaining distorted prices.' Under the "mini-bubbles test," a
80. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,667.
81. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,667.
82. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,667.
83. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,667.
84. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 158.
85. Id. at 159.
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nonmarket economy value was considered market driven if it were shown
to be free of direct or overt central government influence.'
The "mini-bubbles test" was applied by Commerce in the PRC lug
nuts case, which concerned manufacturing costs. To determine whether
the manufacturing costs paid by the lug nut manufacturer were free of
distortion, Commerce examined the nature of the individual transactions
which took place between the manufacturer and its suppliers.
The
shortcoming of this test was Commerce failed to take into account any
price distortion which resulted indirectly from the manufacturing of a
product within a nonmarket economy.
The Commerce Department's published investigation of the PRC
lug nut producers is used below in order to analyze the nature of an
indirect distortion.u A study of this report helps explain why the "minibubbles test" was inadequate for properly determining whether a
manufacturer's operations are truly market oriented. The petitioners in the
report pointed out to the Commerce Department that manufacturers in the
PRC lug nut industry were benefiting from upstream subsidies89 which
were being bestowed upon their steel and chemical suppliers.9 In other
words, subsidies being conferred by the PRC, upon steel and chemical
producers, were significantly affecting the lug nut manufacturers'
production costs. Lower costs for suppliers indirectly resulted in lower
costs for the lug nut manufacturers, thus the latter were enjoying a
competitive benefit from the upstream subsidies. Under section 701(e) of
the Tariff Act, 91 the Commerce Department has the power to investigate
such upstream subsidies if it has reasonable grounds for doing so.'
The Department indicated the petitioners had demonstrated ample
evidence of the existence of upstream subsidies.n However, it seemed the
problem for the Commerce Department was the same one which was at the
heart of the Georgetown Steel decision; the Department was simply
incapable of identifying or quantifying those subsidies because they were

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts and Wheel Locks from the People's Republic of China;
Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 57 Fed. Reg. 877 (1992) [hereinafter
Countervailing Duty Investigation].
89. Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 771A(a)(1) (1995).
90. Countervailing Duty Investigation, 57 Fed. Reg. 878 (1991).

91. Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
92. Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
93. 57 Fed Reg. 878.
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granted in the context of a nonmarket economy. 94 As the court in
Georgetown Steel held, subsidies in nonmarket economies simply have no
meaning within our sense of the concept. As a result, the Department
declined, in the lug nut case, to initiate a separate investigation of the
upstream subsidies.1 This is why the Commerce Department failed to take
into account the indirect price distortions surrounding the lug nut
manufacturers' operations.
The Commerce Department realized this shortcoming and asked
the Court of International Trade for a remand so it could reconsider the
use of this test. During the remand, the Commerce Department developed
another test which would take into account both the direct and indirect
effects of central planning in the determination of whether a particular
nonmarket economy industry is market oriented."
D. The Market Oriented Industry Test: Redetermining the Dumping
Investigations of the Lug Nut and Fan Imports
The Commerce Department's new test was called the market
oriented industry test.Y This test has three parts. To be considered market
oriented, the foreign industry under investigation must: (1) have no
government involvement in the setting of its prices or scheduled output; (2)
"be characterized by private or collective ownership; "9 and (3) pay market
driven prices for all its significant inputs and government determined
prices for only an insignificant proportion of the total value of
production. 99. To determine if prices are market driven, the Commerce
Department looks at the circumstances under which the inputs were
purchased from the supplier and also looks at the supplier itself.a If the
supplier also provides input materials for centrally planned production, it is
unlikely the Commerce Department will find that the suppliers prices are
entirely market driven.' 1' Through this three part test, the Commerce

94. 57 Fed. Reg. 878.
95. 57 Fed. Reg. 878.
96. 57 Fed. Reg. 878.
97. 57 Fed. Reg. 15,052, 15,054.
98. Amendment to Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and Amendment
to Antidumping Duty Order: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts From the People's Republic of China, 57
Fed. Reg. 15,052 (1992).
99. 57 Fed. Reg. 15,052.
100. 57 Fed. Reg. 15,052.
101. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 161.
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Department seeks to ensure the foreign market value of the final goods be
determined by market forces, and not by government influence.'10
While the lug nut and fan cases were on remand, the Commerce
Department applied the market oriented test for the first time on the
imports of Sulfanilic Acid from the People's Republic of China. 0 3 There
the Commerce Department concluded that the Chinese producers did not
produce enough documentary evidence to overcome the presumption that
their input prices were not market driven. ,0,
Consequently, the Commerce
Department used surrogate country values to determine the foreign market
value of the Chinese imports. 0
Shortly following the Sulfanilic Acid case, the Commerce
Department applied the market oriented test to the remanded PRC lug nut
and fan cases.'10 Thus, in the lug nut case, the Commerce Department
looked beyond the manufacturer's individual transactions for its inputs.0""
The Commerce Department found the Chinese government played a
significant role in setting suppliers' prices and outputs of steel, a major
input for the lug-nut manufacturers. '0
As a result, the Commerce
Department concluded the prices the lug nut manufacturers paid for their
steel inputs could not really be considered market driven.' °9 Thus,
surrogate input prices would have to be used to determine the foreign
market value of the lug nuts. The Commerce Department permitted the
fan manufacturers in the other case, however, to use their own prices of
significant inputs since those inputs came from outside the Chinese
market.110
E. The Challenges of Foreign Production Investigations
The above decisions on the proper classification of particular
Chinese industries are obviously much easier to discuss in retrospect than
they were for the Commerce Department to make. This writer gained an
appreciation for the type of nuances with which the Commerce Department
102.

Id. at 141.

103. Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Sulfanilic Acid From
the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 9409 (1992).
104. 57 Fed. Reg. 9409.
105. 57 Fed. Reg. 9409.
106. Judith H. Bello et al., Searchingfor Bubbles of Capitalism, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 665, 715 (1992).
107. Id. at 716.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 716-17.
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had to deal with by studying a particular public document memorandum
which was sent by an import compliance specialist in the Commerce
Department to his division director of antidumping investigations in
January of 1994.'
The compliance specialist, Andrew McGilvray, had
just participated in a meeting at the Beijing offices of the PRC's Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on matters regarding an
antidumping duty investigation of silicon imports from the PRC."1 At the
meeting, the Ministry's Treaty and Law Department Division Chief,
Zhang Yuging, had to explain what he had meant when he informed the
Commerce Department earlier that the Chinese government does not own
or control producers of silicon because they were owned "by all the
people. "13
Zhang explained China has a different ownership concept than
other countries, and when companies in China are said to be owned by all
the people, it does not mean the PRC's central government owns or
controls the companies."' What this really means, said Zhang, is that the
company "belongs to the community," and cannot be taken over by any
individual. Under this setup, the company's employees are responsible for
the company's management. Zhang told the Commerce Department when
a company is owned by all the people, the government cannot interfere in
decision making, nor can it involve itself in the handling of profits, aside
from assessing taxes."- Likewise, such a company is responsible for
financing its own losses or selling off its assets.
The memorandum also includes Zhang's explanation of a
provincial government's role in the ownership and control of such
community owned companies. Zhang explained provincial governments
were authorized by the central government to license businesses, but that
did not mean that these second level governments could legally dictate the
decision making processes of the companies." 6 When asked by the
Commerce Department compliance specialist if the provincial governments
were still permitted to influence companies to comply with any of the
Commerce Department's import regulations, Zhang explained the

111. Memorandum to Gary Taverman, Director, Division I, Office of Antidumping
Investigations, Investigation Public Document A-570-824 (Feb. 15, 1994) [hereinafter
Memorandum to Taverman].
112. Id.at 3.
113.

Id. Commerce was concerned that this meant that the state still had ownership

control.
114.

Id.

115.

Id.

116. Memorandum to Taverman, supra note 11.
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governments could not force compliance but could give incentives for it.
In sum, the memorandum is valuable as an example of the attention the
Commerce Department must give to the meanings which different
Such attention is
countries attach to their economic terminology.
properly
evaluate the
necessary if the Commerce Department is to
economic information it has on a country in order to make an accurate
market oriented industry analysis. If the Commerce Department is to
correctly apply or not apply countervailing duty law to countries in
transition, it has to know which industries are in fact state controlled and
which industries only sound as if they are because of the foreign
terminology used to describe them.

F. A Market Oriented Manufacturer: Imports of Magnesium from
the Russian Federation
While the Chinese cases involved market orientation analyses of
whole industries, a recent final determination was issued by the Commerce
Department in the spring of 1995 which involved a decision on whether a
single manufacturer within a reforming nonmarket economy was
sufficiently market oriented in its operations for antidumping pricing
purposes. The purpose of the investigation was to decide whether the
Russian magnesium sector from the Russian Federation was sufficiently
market oriented to permit use of Russian producers' own prices in the
dumping determination." One of the two Russian manufacturers involved,
SMW, requested the Department to conduct an individual market
orientation examination of the company, rather than the usual examination
of the entire industry within which the company operates. '8 SMW wanted
to demonstrate that government ownership and control were absent from
its own individual operations." 9 SMW was ultimately seeking to have the
Commerce Department make an individualized dumping calculation for its
own exports of alloy and pure magnesium, which was separate from other
potential Russian exporters of magnesium.1"
The Commerce Department granted SMW's request for the
opportunity to demonstrate its own market independence, but asserted that
to make such a positive showing, SMW would have to demonstrate the
absence of both de jure and de facto governmental control over its export

117. Notice Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Pure Magnesium and
Alloy Magnesium From the Russian Federation, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,440 (1995).
118. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.
119. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.
120. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.
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operations.12' Evidence which the Commerce Department indicated SMW
could use, but did not require in order to support a finding of de jure
absence of central controls included:
"(1) an absence of restrictive
stipulations associated with [its] business and export licenses; (2) any
legislative enactments decentralizing control of companies; or (3) any other
formal measures by the government decentralizing control of
companies."'2 To determine whether governmental control over SMW
was absent de facto, the Commerce Department stated it would weigh the
following factors:
(1) whether [SMW's] export prices are set by or subject to
the approval of [governmental] authority; (2) whether
[SMW] has authority to negotiate and sign contracts and
other agreements; (3) whether [SMW] has autonomy from
the government in making decisions regarding the selection
of management; and (4) whether [SMW] retains the
proceeds of its export sales and makes independent
decisions regarding disposition of profits or financing of
losses. 1
Pursuant to its stated guidelines, the Commerce Department decided that
central control of SMW was absent de jure on the basis of the following
findings. '4 First, the President of the Russian Federation had issued a
decree in July of 1992 that joint stock companies, such as SMW, were out
of the control of state authority. '2 Second, a law had been passed in July
of 1991 which mandated the privatization of former state held enterprises,
such as SMW.'2
The Department was also satisfied with findings on SMW's de
facto independence. The Commerce Department found that SMW set its
own prices, had free access to its own export profits, could finance its own
losses, and could purchase foreign currency or dispose of assets.'" In
addition, the Commerce Department found that the Russian government
did not interfere with SMW's disposition of its sales proceeds, and that the
board of SMW was responsible for the appointment of its management.'

121. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,444.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
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60
60
60
60
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Fed.
Fed.
Fed.
Fed.
Fed.

Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
60 Fed. Reg.
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This writer believes that the Russian magnesium case is significant
in that it demonstrates the level of sensitivity with which the Commerce
Department now deals in matters of market orientation determinations.
"Sensitivity" refers to the degree to which the Department is willing to go
beneath the nonmarket surface of an economy to find individual entities of
capitalism. With final determinations on the Chinese fan and lug nut
cases, we saw the Commerce Department go beyond the nonmarket
exterior of the PRC's economy in order to investigate the possible market
oriented nature of a particular industry. With the Russian magnesium
case, the Department went further by looking beyond the nature of a
certain industry within the reforming Russian economy to examine the
status of a particular company in that industry. Thus, to this writer, this
methodology in "Magnesium from the Russian Federation" seemed as if it
were a return to the type of analysis once used by the Commerce
Department in the mini-bubbles test, as discussed previously. Recall that
this test, used only in the preliminary determinations of the Chinese fan
and lug-nut cases, involved a thorough investigation of certain individual
manufacturers within a particular industry, for purposes of determining
whether their own prices were market driven. In the Russian magnesium
case, the Department was doing essentially the same thing. It is worth
noting that the above de jure and de facto tests used in the Russian case for
determining the absence of government control are substantially similar to
the corresponding tests used in the preliminary determinations of the
Chinese fan case, as discussed previously.
The Commerce Department's willingness to look beyond whole
industries and to focus instead on individual companies indicates that, as
reforming nonmarkets move closer to capitalism, an industry wide
investigation will not always yield a proper finding for whether
countervailing duty law ought to apply to certain imports. Perhaps one of
the marks of an economy in transition is that some companies within a
particular industry move more quickly toward market orientation, while
others take more time to free themselves from state control. By confining
an investigation to a single producer, rather than the producer's whole
industry, the Department seems to be sensitive to the microcosmic levels
on which capitalism sometimes apparently exists in transitional markets.
This has particular import to this study on countervailing duties: The
greater willingness the Department has to find capitalistic entities within
reforming markets, and the more likely such markets are to find
countervailing duty law applied to their imports.
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VI. APPLICATION OF COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW TO REFORMING
NONMARKET ECONOMIES

A. Market Oriented Industry Analysis:
Countervailing Duty
Investigations of the Lug Nut and Fan Import Cases
The above developments in antidumping law are important to our
discussion of countervailing duty law and reforming nonmarket economies.
As previously noted, the Commerce Department faces the near future
possibility of having to decide whether to apply countervailing duties to
imports from nonmarket economy countries in transition. The current
Commerce Department policy is that such duties are inapplicable to
nonmarket economies. However, the Commerce Department might find
that a foreign industry in question is a market oriented part of an otherwise
nonmarket economy. In that case, the Department may be forced into
making a determination as to whether countervailing duty law is
inapplicable. The Department would not have any countervailing duty law
to aid it in a decision such as this. It would, however, have the above
antidumping laws and policies to turn to. Using the market oriented
industry analysis, the Commerce Department may one day come to the
conclusion that countervailing duty law is applicable to a particular
industry within a nonmarket economy.
The Commerce Department has already used the market oriented
test in two countervailing duty investigations which it recently conducted.
In the cases involving the importation of fans and lug nuts from the
People's Republic of China, the Commerce Department used this test to
determine if countervailing duties were applicable on the basis that the
industries in question were actually market oriented. 29 In neither case did
the Department find that the industry in question was really market
1
oriented, so countervailing duty orders were not issued. 30
In these countervailing duty cases, the Commerce Department
applied a system of evaluation which it had developed for the purposes of
antidumping law. For example, in its preliminary determinations in the
Ceiling Fans countervailing duty case, the Commerce Department first
sought to determine whether the Chinese government was involved in
129. See Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Oscillating and Ceiling Fans
From the People's Republic of China (PRC), 56 Fed. Reg. 57,616 (1991); Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigation: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts and Wheel Locks From the
People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 877 (1992).
130. See Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling
Fans From the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,018 (1992); Rescission of Initiation
of Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of Petition: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts and
Wheel Locks From the People's Republic of China (PRC), 57 Fed. Reg. 10,459 (1992).
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setting prices and production amounts in the fan industry."' Then the
Commerce Department tried to determine whether or not the industry was
generally characterized by private and collective ownership by fan
producers.'
Finally, the Commerce Department sought out whether the
fan producers under investigation paid state set or market driven prices for
their major inputs purchased within China. 33 Here, as in the lug nuts
antidumping case, the Department found that the government played a
significant role in setting prices and outputs of suppliers of steel. Since
steel represents a major portion of the fan manufacturers' input purchases,
the Department decided that the fan industry cannot be considered a
capitalistic industry within an otherwise nonmarket economy."" Thus,
countervailing duties could not be applied to the fan imports.
The Commerce Department decided that countervailing duties
were inapplicable to the lug nut imports as well.'"
Again, the final
determination was based on finding the steel industry in China was heavily
controlled by central planning. Thus, the industry could not be considered
to be market oriented either.
B. Reforming Nonmarket Economy Manufacturers Absorbed by
Capitalism: Imports of Steelfrom Germany
The previous cases involving Chinese imports demonstrated the
Commerce Department would be making more decisions on the
applicability of countervailing duty law to reforming nonmarket economy
imports in the near future. As previously noted, such cases have yet to be
brought before the Department. As a result, the Commerce Department
has not taken an official stance on when countervailing duties could be
applied to imports from reforming countries, such as those in Eastern
Europe. One countervailing duty case, which did come before the
Department and which is of interest to this study, involved subsidies to
certain German manufacturers of carbon steel products."' In this case,
subsidies to the manufacturers were found to clearly exist, and the
International Trade Code found a reasonable indication of material injury
or threat of material injury to United States' manufacturers of like
131. Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling
Fans From the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,011-12 (1992).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
Germany,

57 Fed. Reg. 10,012.
57 Fed. Reg. 10,012.
57 Fed. Reg. 10,013.
57 Fed. Reg. 10,459.
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Steel Products From
58 Fed. Reg. 37,315 (1993).
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products.'
Since Germany is a market oriented country, it would have
seemed that the determination to apply countervailing duties would be
routine.
The final determination in this case was not so routine, and this is
The
interesting because of the German manufacturers' defense.
manufacturers argued that the United States' countervailing duty law was
inapplicable to them because they were located in the former East
Germany. 3 8 The manufacturers asserted the Commerce Department
exempts countervailing duty law companies located in countries still
Under this policy, the
considered to have nonmarket economies.
manufacturers proceeded to argue countervailing duty law should likewise
be inapplicable to producers located in a former nonmarket economy
which is adapting to a market economy.'39
This was an unusual case because subsidized manufacturers in a
market country were asking for an exemption from United States'
countervailing duty law. The manufacturers were recently operating
within a nonmarket economy. The manufacturers felt that the application
of countervailing duty rules to their case would result in an unequal
treatment of producers in the former East Germany and those in other
former East Bloc countries.1'4 The manufacturers argued they should be
treated equally with producers in reforming countries such as Poland and
Romania where antidumping proceedings had initiated, but where no
countervailing duty action has been taken. According to the German
manufacturers, countervailing duty law was inapplicable in those countries
4
because of their status as former nonmarket economies in transition.1 '
A further argument for exemption from the United States'
countervailing duty law by the German producers is the United States'
obligation to MFN treatment under GATT. 4 2 The producers pointed to the
Department's recent decision not to apply countervailing duties to the
oscillating and ceiling fan imports from China. They felt that, under the
MFN status, Chinese imports were going to be exempted from
countervailing duty law, then there ought to be an exemption as well for
imports from the former East Germany, which was a former nonmarket
economy in transition.' 3
137. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315.

138. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
139. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
140. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315, 37,324.
141. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315-24.
142. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315-24.

143. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315-24.
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With respect to this last argument, the German producers perhaps
misunderstood the reasoning upon which the Commerce Department based
its decision in oscillating and ceiling fans from the PRC. The Department
did not decide to exempt the Chinese imports because they were from a
nonmarket economy which was undergoing some reform.
As
demonstrated previously, The Commerce Department was more than
willing to apply countervailing duties to the imports, regardless of the
PRC's political-economic status. What the Commerce Department was
concerned with was the status of the individual Chinese industry in
question.
The Commerce Department ultimately decided against
countervailing duties because it could not find sufficient evidence that the
fan industry was really market oriented. Thus, the German producers
could not claim the same exemption under the most favored nation
principle because they were indeed operating in a recognized market
economy.
With respect to the rest of the German producers' argument, the
Department sided with the claims of the petitioning American producers.
The Commerce Department agreed with the Americans the imports under
investigation ought to be looked at as imports from the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), not from the former German Democratic Republic.'"
Furthermore, the subsidy programs being examined were funded by the
FRG.14 - These simple facts appeared to have made the difference in this
case. Because the FRG is a market economy, government subsidies have
real economic meaning. Additionally, they can certainly be identified and
quantified. Contrast this with subsidies given to producers in nonmarket
economy countries. Nonmarket economy subsidies have no meaning in
our capitalistic sense because they cause market distortions and result in
sales which would not have otherwise been achieved. They cannot be
identified anyway since prices are controlled by the state. This is the
fundamental reason why the Commerce Department generally exempts
nonmarket economy imports from countervailing duties. Thus, it is futile
for producers such as the German manufacturers in this case, or their
counsel, to attempt to introduce issues of political economic status, or
MFN status, as grounds for exemption from countervailing duty law. In
short, the Commerce Department will apply this law as long as it finds the
subsidies in question have real economic meaning and can be identified,
regardless of whether the foreign industry in question operates within a
nonmarket economy or one in transition.

144. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
145. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
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The petitioners were correct to assert the subsidies in question
were exactly those which United States' countervailing duty law was
designed to counteract."4
Thus, the petitioners were also correct in
pointing out the Commerce Department would be violating the United
States' obligations to GATT if it did not apply countervailing duties to
these imports because the United States would be extending preferential
treatment to Germany against the interests of other producers in market
7
oriented economies.14
In its final determination to impose countervailing duties on the
carbon steel imports from Germany, the Department emphasized that
United States' countervailing duty law does not prohibit a domestic
industry from a countervailing duty petition against a reforming nonmarket
industry, whether it has been absorbed into a market oriented economy, as
with the GDR, or whether it is still in a transitional process.," In each
case, the basic test will be whether the industry under investigation is
sufficiently market oriented for the law to apply. In addition, the
Department noted that application of our countervailing duty law is
consistent with our GATT obligations under Article 15 of the subsidies
code allows a country to apply either a countervailing duty law or an
antidumping law to imports from a country with a state controlled
economy. 4 9
The final determination on the German carbon steel case is an
important statement by the Commerce Department, if for no other reason
than reasserting the major factors upon which it makes its countervailing
duty decisions. The determinations on the Chinese imports were grounded
on the market oriented industry test discussed earlier, and not on the fact
that China was a nonmarket economy undergoing reform. Had prices
within the Chinese fan industry been found to be sufficiently market
driven, the result would have been different.
VII.

TREATING REFORMING NONMARKET ECONOMIES AS MARKET
ECONOMIES
A. Analyzing an Economy for Market Orientation: the Russian
Magnesium Imports
The Commerce Department need not look at a country's whole
economy in order to make a market orientation determination for purposes
146.
147.
148.
149.

58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
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of antidumping or countervailing duty law cases. As demonstrated in the
cases concerning Chinese and Russian imports, the Department can restrict
its investigations to a particular industry, or even a single producer.
However, the very recent Russian magnesium case also demonstrated, as
numerous reforming nonmarket economies move closer to market
orientation, the Commerce Department may soon be using individual
antidumping or countervailing duty cases to decide whether particular
nonmarket economies ought to be reclassified. Though not mentioned in
the earlier discussion of the Russian case, the two Russian producers
involved actually first asked the Department to use their own prices on the
basis that the Russian economy as a whole ought to be reclassified by the
Commerce Department from its previous nonmarket status. '*
In Magnesium from the Russian Federation, the Russian
manufacturers claimed that the current economic conditions, which were
prevalent throughout Russia, warranted revocation of the country's
nonmarket economy status for purposes of antidumping law price
determinations."' The Commerce Department asserted that such a finding
would center on an analysis of the Russian government's role in the
1 2
country's general economic activity.
In determining whether to revoke the Russian Federation's
status as a nonmarket economy, the Commerce
Department turned to the factors listed under section
771(18) of the amended Tariff Act of 1930.' 5
In
particular, these criteria are: (1) the extent to which the
currency of the foreign country is convertible into the
currencies of other countries; (2) the extent to which wage
rates in the foreign country are determined by free
bargaining between labor and management; (3) the extent
to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of
other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign
country; (4) the extent of government ownership or control
of the means of production; (5) the extent of government
control over the allocation of resources and over the price

150.

60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.

151. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443. Recall from the earlier discussion that nonmarket producers'
costs are presumed to be distorted unless the producers demonstrate otherwise under the market
oriented industry test.
152.

60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.

153.

60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.
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and output decisions of enterprises; and (6) other factors
the Commerce Department considers appropriate."'"
Pursuant to the above guidelines, the Department concluded that
the Russian Federation still merited a nonmarket economy treatment for
purposes of antidumping law.'" Though it was evident to the Commerce
Department that Russia had made significant steps toward a market
economy by freeing most prices, and privatizing most state held
enterprises, the Commerce Department was not convinced that functioning
markets had replaced state controls. Nor was the Commerce Department
satisfied that prices and costs in Russia adequately reflected market
considerations.'-

B. Foreign Policy Concerns for the Commerce Department to
Consider
The Russian magnesium case demonstrates the significant authority
vested in the Commerce Department for classifying individual foreign
markets for purposes of applying countervailing duty law or making
antidumping calculations.
Under the trade statutes, the Commerce
Department may at any time make a determination that a foreign country is
or is not a nonmarket economy. 7 As of the end of 1994, Poland is the
only country which the Commerce Department has reclassified from a
nonmarket to a market nation.'
As illustrated above, the Commerce
Department's decision to treat a nation as a market or nonmarket economy
revolves around the application of a thorough statutory test. However, the
decision to begin treating a nonmarket nation as a market country means
the Commerce Department can begin applying countervailing duties to
exports in appropriate situations. Thus, the making of this decision ought
to perhaps also include a careful consideration of certain important foreign
policy issues.
Chief among the policy issues to consider is the fact that the
application of countervailing duties to the imports of reforming markets
can substantially slow their transitions. Countervailing duties obviously
impose a cost on a foreign producer sales within the United States. The
lost sales have a heightened significance when the foreign producer is new
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to the competition of the free market because it becomes more difficult for
the producer to establish products in the United States. If the producer
cannot successfully break into an important market such as the United
States, its market share might never grow. It follows such producers
might begin believing the move to a free market was not as good a change
as it might have originally promised.
Countervailing duties are also viewed by many in Eastern Europe
as an unfair United States' practice which threatens to undermine much of
the political and economic reform going on in the area.
Some are
concerned that the negative feeling which it stirs among producers might
only serve to strengthen the arguments of those who would prefer to see a
return to full central planning.,59 Others are convinced such duties are just
another example of the "capricious and discriminatory policies of the

West. "60
The United States has certainly demonstrated that it wants to
develop trade with Eastern Europe, as evidenced in large part by our
substantial funding of economic development in that region, as well as by
numerous political announcements and promises. For instance, the United
States clearly would like to see a continued development in the former East
Germany in order to expand our trade interests in Germany. The more
rapidly that area can develop, the more quickly United States' exporters
can benefit from the large potential market there. However, the United
States retards that expansion when it applies countervailing duties to those
imports being purchased from manufacturers operating in the reforming
region of Germany.' 6' Countervailing duties hurt exporters' profits, which
hurts industry in general and slows development.
Does the Commerce Department really even have a choice in these
matters? On the one hand, the Department probably joins United States'
exporters in its desire for continued development in reforming areas. On
the other hand, the Commerce Department has its duty to United States'
manufacturers to apply the law of countervailing duties wherever it is
applicable, regardless of policy concerns.
United States' producers
obviously view an unfairly subsidized import as an unfairly subsidized
import, regardless of the import's country of origin. To United States'
manufacturers, countervailing duty law exists to protect them from just
such imports, from where ever those imports may arrive. Moreover, the
Commerce Department must consider United States' MFN status
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obligations under GATT. Exemption of countervailing duties for a certain
country might be supported by foreign policy, but it is certainly not
supported by the GATT.

